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Abstract 
Antisocial punishment - punishment of pro-social cooperators - has shown to be detrimental 
for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives 
behind  antisocial  punishment  acts  are  not  yet  well  understood.  This  article  shows  that 
inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. 
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) allows to derive conditions under which antisocial 
punishment occurs. With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I 
evaluate  the  predictions.  A  majority  of  the  observed  antisocial  punishment  acts  are  not 
compatible with inequality aversion. These results suggest that the desire to equalize payoffs 
is not a major determinant of antisocial punishment. 
Keywords 
Antisocial punishment, inequality aversion 
JEL Classification 
D03, H41, C72, C91 1 Introduction
A large strand of literature in experimental social psychology and experi-
mental economics has demonstrated that informal sanctions can solve social
dilemmas.1 The upshot of this literature is that, when people are able to
punish others dependent on their contributions, they do so in a way that free
riding is no longer protable and even selsh subjects nd it worthwhile to
contribute. The public goods game is then no longer a social dilemma and
the groups manages to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).
This is very remarkable, because the punishment of free riders is per con-
struction also plagued by free rider incentives: in the best world I would
have others educate the free riders to become contributors and enjoy their
contributions without engaging in costly punishment myself.
Recent experimental evidence, however, puts the generality of these re-
sults into question. G achter, Herrmann, and Th oni (2005) began investi-
gating public goods games with punishment in dierent cultures and found
that the punishment option is hardly eective in enhancing cooperation in
some of their subject pools. They presented preliminary evidence that the
variation in cooperation across their subject pools is connected to the use
of the punishment option. Interestingly, the dierences are not in the way
subjects treat free riders, but in the way they treat cooperative subjects. For
punishment targeted to subjects with a weakly higher contribution than the
punisher Herrmann, Th oni, and G achter (2008) coined the term `antisocial
punishment'.2 They investigate sixteen culturally diverse subject pools and
show that there is a clear-cut connection between the prevalence of antiso-
cial punishment and the eectiveness of the punishment option in fostering
cooperation. In subject pools where antisocial punishment is frequent sub-
jects do not prot from the punishment option and earn lower prots than
without the punishment option.
Given that antisocial punishment is a major obstacle for cooperation it
is important to understand the motives behind antisocial punishment. Fehr
and G achter (2000, p. 990) devote a footnote to the causes of antisocial
1See e.g. Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Fehr and G achter
(2000, 2002).
2There are dierent denitions for the punishment of cooperative subjects in the liter-
ature. Herrmann et al. (2008) focus on the bilateral comparison of contributions between
punisher and punishee. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2005) investigate motives behind
the punishment decision in the prisoners' dilemma and call the punishment of cooperative
subjects `spiteful punishment', indicating that they see the motive to increase payo dier-
ences as a determinant for such punishment acts (see also Noussair, Masclet, Tucker, and
Villeval, 2003). Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2006) dene `perverse punishment'
as punishing a subject who contributes more than the group average. They investigate
whether second order punishment, i.e., punishing the punishers, eliminates perverse pun-
ishment. Nikiforakis (2008) addresses a similar question in a dierent design. Further data
on antisocial punishment is reported by Anderson and Putterman (2006), and G achter and
Herrmann (2009, 2011).
3punishment. They mention random error, improvement of the relative po-
sition (status preferences), and revenge for anticipated or past punishment.
Herrmann et al. (2008) provide a more extensive account for the causes of
antisocial punishment, adding `do-gooder derogation' (Monin, 2007), and a
desire to punish non-confomists to the list. In the data they nd evidence for
the revenge explanation but their experiment is not designed to dierenti-
ate between various motives behind antisocial punishment. To date there is
no experimental study that systematically explores the causes of antisocial
punishment.
This paper brings an additional, maybe surprising reason for antisocial
punishment into the discussion. In the next section I use the model of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) to show that inequality aversion predicts antisocial pun-
ishment in many cases. Consider a situation where (i) cooperative players
are faced with a free rider and (ii) not all cooperators are willing to punish
the free rider. Inequality aversion predicts that those who punish do not
only punish the free rider, but also the cooperative players who do not pun-
ish. This ensures that the punishing players do not fall behind the players
who free ride on their punishment expenditures. For punishment of free
riders Fowler, Johnson, and Smirnov (2005) and Dawes, Fowler, Johnson,
Mcelreath, and Smirnov (2007) argue that egalitarian motives drive pun-
ishment decisions. In section 3 I use data from three experimental studies
on public goods games with punishment to investigate whether the same is
true for antisocial punishment. The answer is no - the majority of antisocial
punishment acts occur in situations which do not meet the conditions for
antisocial punishment as explained by inequality aversion.
2 Theory
On pages 836{843 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive equilibria in public goods
games with and without punishment. They show that in the game with pun-
ishment cooperative equilibria are possible. In these equilibria also selsh
players contribute as long as there is a subgroup of suciently inequality
averse players who are ready to punish deviators. Their characterization of
the o-equilibrium path in the game with punishment is, however, incom-
plete and thus fails to account for antisocial punishment. In the following
I show that inequality averse players might not only punish deviant group
members, but also players who contributed more than themselves.
2.1 The game
There are n > 3 players with an endowment of y monetary units. The game
consists of two stages. In the rst stage players simultaneously contribute
gi 2 [0;y] to a public good. After the contribution decision all players learn
all contributions and their stage 1 earnings wi, calculated as




where g is the vector of all contributions and a is the marginal per capita
return of the public good with 1
n < a < 1. In the second stage players
can punish each other bilaterally by assigning punishment points pij > 0,
which reduce the monetary payo of j by one unit at a cost of c units to the
punisher i, and 0 < c < 1. Antisocial punishment occurs when a player i
punishes another player j who chose a weakly higher contribution (gj > gi).
Punishment of a player j with a lower contribution (gj < gi) will be labeled
as `free rider punishment', irrespective of the absolute level of gj. The nal
monetary payo for player i is







with P being an nn matrix with zeros on the main diagonal (masochistic
punishment is usually not allowed in these experiments). Players have Fehr-
Schmidt utility functions










max[xi   xj;0]; (3)
where every unit of payo dierence in bilateral payo comparisons reduces
utility by i
n 1 in case the other player earns more and
i
n 1 in case the
other player earns less than player i. Fehr and Schmidt put restrictions
on the preferences parameters: both kinds of inequality hurt or are neutral
(i;i > 0), having less than others hurts weakly more than having more
(i > i), and having more than others must not hurt so badly that an
individual would want to burn his own money (i < 1).
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 841) show that, if suciently many players
are inequality averse, subgame perfect equilibria with non-minimal contri-
butions gi = g 2 (0;y] 8 i exist. In these equilibria also selsh players
contribute g, because the inequality averse players can credibly threaten
with punishment. In equilibrium no punishment occurs. To explain any
kind of punishment, we need to assume that at least one player deviated
from the equilibrium strategy and chose gi < g. In the following we restrict
our attention to the subgame where pij is chosen; I refer to this subgame as
the `punishment subgame'.3 I present three simple numerical examples to
illustrate how players with Fehr-Schmidt preferences punish other players.
A general solution of the punishment subgame is provided in the Appendix.
3In fact, the analysis that follows is applicable to any situation where members of a
group of n players, endowed with some income w, can mutually reduce their incomes by
the punishment mechanism described in equation (2).
5No punish. Fehr-Schmidt Prop. 5 Optimal
Player gi wi ui pEj xi ui pEj xi ui
E 20 20  20 10  10 0 0
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0
2 0 40 40 30 10 10 40 0 0
Table 1: Antisocial punishment in a three player public goods game with
punishment. Bold numbers indicate utilities or punishment acts of player
E, the enforcer.
The rst two examples focus on a situation in which only one player is willing
to punish other players.
2.2 The lone enforcer







the group consists of two players, 1 and 2, with selsh preferences, i.e.,
fi;ig = f0;0g, i = 1;2, while the third player E shall be inequality averse
with fE;Eg = f4;:6g, henceforth called the enforcer.
Consider a situation where E and player 1 contributed 20, while player 2
contributed 0.4 The rst part of Table 1 shows the utilities that result
from this situation if no punishment is exerted. How should players punish
each other? The two selsh players would certainly not punish because
punishment is costly and yields no benet to them. Player E, however, might
want to punish because she does not like the fact that player 2 earns more
than she does. Her utility without punishment amounts to  20, because
she suers from disadvantageous inequality towards player 2 of 20 monetary
units. According to the Fehr-Schmidt utility this dierence is weighted by
E
2 and subtracted from the monetary income. So what relief can E give
herself by punishing others? According to Fehr and Schmidt's Proposition
5, E should reduce player 2's income by pE2 = 30 units (see intermediate
columns in Table 1). This would equalize player 2's and E's monetary
income and increase E's utility to  10.
However, this is not the equilibrium of the punishment subgame. In fact,
E is not playing best response if she just punishes the deviator (player 2).
The last three columns of Table 1 show the optimal punishment strategy.
E maximizes her utility if she punishes both other players. She does so in
a way to equalize all three monetary payos, which allows her to enjoy a
utility of zero. Thus, the Fehr-Schmidt utility function does indeed predict
antisocial punishment, i.e., punishment of players who are equally or more
cooperative than the punisher.
4Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 841) show that the composition of types and parameters
assumed here allows for a fully cooperative equilibrium. To explain punishment we need
to assume that one player deviates in the contribution stage.
6No punish. Weakly ineq. averse Strongly ineq. averse











1 0 36 36 6 30 30 16 20 20
2 11 25 25 25 25 5 20 20
3 20 16 16 16 16 16 16
Table 2: Optimal punishment for a weakly or strongly inequality averse
enforcer in a four player public goods game with punishment.
Example 2. In a next step let us consider a richer example. Table 2







To make things interesting I assume that the enforcer chose a contribution of
9, and the other players in the group chose 0, 11, and 20. This produces a set
of stage 1 earnings as depicted in the third column of Table 2. Let us look at
two types of enforcers, a `weakly inequality averse' player with fE;Eg =
f1;:6g, and a `strongly inequality averse' player with fE;Eg = f4;:6g.
These two types will have dierent optimal punishment patterns. The three
columns in the middle of Table 2 show the optimal punishment strategy of
the weakly inequality averse player. Such a player maximizes his utility by
punishing the richest among the other players (the free rider). However,
punishment is only utility maximizing as long as E's income does not drop
below another player's income. Consequently, as soon as player E's income
is as low as the next lower income (in this case player 2's income), he does
not exert more punishment, despite the fact that player 1 still earns more
than he does.
A strongly inequality averse player does not stop here. Her much higher
E means that the income dierence towards player 1 still weighs heavily on
her well-being. A strongly inequality averse player prefers to further decrease
player 1's income. However, in order to avoid falling behind player 2, she
punishes both other players with weakly higher incomes. Player E's utility is
maximized when the incomes of player 1 and 2 are equal to her own income.
What does this mean for antisocial punishment? The weakly inequal-
ity averse player in our example does not engage in antisocial punishment,
whereas the strongly inequality averse player does mete out punishment to a
player who was more cooperative than herself. This example demonstrates
the necessary conditions for antisocial punishment: (i) player E must be
suciently inequality averse to be willing to punish more than one other
player, (ii) there must be a least one player with a strictly higher income
than E, and (iii) in the process of punishing the strictly richer player, E's
income must undershoot one of the other (weakly poorer) player's incomes.
7No punish. Fehr-Schmidt Prop. 5 Optimal punishment
Player gi wi ui pE1j pE2j xi ui pE1j pE2j xi ui
E1 20 24  16 20 12 19 19
E2 20 24  16 20 12 19 19
1 20 24 24 24 24 2:5 2:5 19 19
2 0 44 44 12 12 20 20 12:5 12:5 19 19
Table 3: Optimal punishment in a four player public goods game with pun-
ishment with two enforcers.
2.3 Teaming up
Example 3. What if more than one player is inequality averse enough to
punish other players? Let there be a subgroup of n0 = 2 homogeneous






. Table 3 shows the situation of
two enforcers with fE;Eg = f4;:6g facing one cooperative player and one
free rider. According to Proposition 5 in Fehr and Schmidt the two enforcers
should punish player 2 (the free rider) such that this player's income is equal
to their income. However, similar to the case of the lone enforcer, the two
enforcers can improve their situation if they also punish player 1. In the
example they maximize their utility by equalizing the monetary payo of all
four players. However, unlike in the case of the lone enforcer, only punishing
the deviant player is also an equilibrium of the punishment subgame. If E1
punishes only player 2 by 12 units, then E2's best response is to punish
only player 2 by 12 units as well and vice versa. However, the equilibrium
including antisocial punishment towards the fully contributing non-enforcer
is clearly more ecient for the two enforcers.
2.4 Conditions for antisocial punishment
The three examples show that antisocial punishment motivated by Fehr-
Schmidt inequality aversion happens only in order to prevent falling behind
other players who do not punish.6 The Appendix provides a general solution
to the punishment subgame. A decisive prerequisite is the existence of other
players who do not engage in punishment. Thus, the decision whether to
engage in antisocial punishment or not depends on players' beliefs about
other players' punishment behavior. This dependency on beliefs makes it
dicult to identify sucient conditions for antisocial punishment, as long
5To keep things simple I assume that all enforcers are homogeneous both in their
preferences (equal E and E) and in their stage 1 earnings wEi.
6Note that the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is also capable in predicting
antisocial punishment, but does so in a rather trivial way. In this model players care
about their share of the total pie (and their own income). If they earn to low a share they
can increase their share by punishing any other group member, not just the free rider.
Consequently, the ERC model has no predictive power whatsoever about the direction of
punishment.
8as beliefs are not measured.
However, for an empirical test of the predictions it is easy to derive two
necessary conditions for the occurrence of antisocial punishment in public
goods games with punishment. If antisocial punishment is motivated by
Fehr-Schmidt like inequality aversion, then it must hold that:
C1: A maximum earner never punishes, i.e., antisocial punishment can only
occur if the punisher's stage 1 income is below the maximum stage 1
income in the group.
C2: The only reason for an enforcer to punish a weakly poorer player is
to avoid falling behind this player while punishing free riders. Con-
sequently, antisocial punishment can only occur in combination with
punishment of a richer player.7
Proofs are provided in the Appendix. In the next step I confront these
two conditions with data on antisocial punishment.
3 Empirics
In this section I use the data of three studies on public goods games with
punishment. First I look at the study by Fehr and G achter (2002) who report
data from 120 subjects playing six rounds of the public goods game with
punishment with fn;y;a;cg = f4;20; 2
5; 1
3g.8 They use a perfect stranger
matching protocol, which ensures that, during the six rounds, a subject
will not meet another subject in the session more than once. Thus, from a
game-theoretic perspective we observe the subjects playing six consecutive
one-shot games.
Using this data I investigate whether observed acts of antisocial punish-
ment are in line with the predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The rst
result addresses C1.
Result 1: Maximum earners punish
Support. According to C1 all antisocial punishment must come from subjects
who earn less than the maximum stage 1 income in a group. In Fehr and
7This holds for symmetric equilibria of the punishment subgame, i.e., equilibria where
all enforcers punish the other players equally. Because the enforcers do only care about
nal payos they could freely reallocate punishment points among themselves, as long
as the total amount of punishment meted out by each punisher and received by each
punishee remains constant. In case the group of enforcers is suciently large there can be
asymmetric equilibria where some enforcers mete out exclusively antisocial punishment.
8I use only the data from the sessions with the sequence punishment - no punishment.
9G achter's data top earners punish weakly poorer subjects by 1.60 punish-
ment points on average.9 Antisocial punishment meted out by top earners
is obviously not zero, but is that number small or large? Subjects who are
not among the richest in their group mete out .43 punishment points to
weakly poorer subjects.10 Thus, not only do the richest subjects in the ex-
periments by Fehr and G achter (2002) punish other weakly poorer players -
they do so even stronger than subjects who are not among the richest in the
group. This dierence is signicant by a Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (z =  2:61, p = 0:009, test based on independent session averages).
Result 2: Subjects frequently mete out only antisocial punishment
Support. According to C2 every act of antisocial punishment should be ac-
companied by punishment of a subject with a lower contribution than the
punisher. The upper part of Table 4 classies all 720 individual punishment
vectors. In about 43% of the cases no subject gets punished. In about 42%
of the cases only free riders (i.e. subjects with a lower contribution than
the punisher) receive punishment. About 15% (105) of the cases involve
antisocial punishment. In 75% of these cases antisocial punishment is not
accompanied by free rider punishment. Thus, contrary to the theoretical
prediction, antisocial punishment is most frequently meted out without ac-
companying free rider punishment.
The evidence presented clearly indicates that the two necessary condi-
tions for antisocial punishment as explained by the Fehr-Schmidt model are
very frequently not met for actual acts of antisocial punishment. The analy-
sis could, however, be inuenced by the fact that subjects in the experiments
by Fehr and G achter (2002) play six consecutive games. Despite the use of
the perfect stranger matching we cannot be sure that the game reects a
true one-shot game. The fact that the authors observe a time trend in av-
erage contributions even suggests that the six rounds are not identical. A
recent study by G achter and Herrmann (2009) provides data from true one-






. In a next step I apply the same
analysis to this data set. The data contains observations from 265 subjects
in four locations in Russia and Switzerland.11 For the moment I ignore the
9The number corresponds to the parameter pij in equation 2, i.e., to the average re-
duction of the punishee's income. In the experiment subjects choose `deduction points',
which reduce the punishee's income by three units and cost the punisher one unit. Deduc-
tion points are limited to integers and up to ten points per punishment act. Thus, in the
experiment the optimal punishment solution presented in Table 1 is not feasible, because
player 2's income cannot be reduced by more than 30 units.
10This comparison controls for the fact that a subject who is among the richest players
has more `occasions' to engage in antisocial punishment than a poorer subject, because
it is the average number of punishment points assigned in all bilateral comparisons with
weakly poorer subjects.
11Like in the rst data set I use only the data from the sessions which started with the
one-shot public goods game with punishment.
10Fehr and G achter (2002) Free rider punishment
No Yes
Antisocial punishment
No 310 305 615
Yes 79 26 105
389 331 720
G achter and Herrmann (2009) Free rider punishment
No Yes
Antisocial punishment No 130 75 205
Yes 43 17 60
173 92 265
Table 4: No. of cases with no, antisocial, free rider, or both kinds of pun-
ishment. Data source upper part: Fehr and G achter (2002), lower part:
G achter and Herrmann (2009), own calculation.
fact that motivations for antisocial punishment might dier across subject
pools. This point will be addressed below.
The results from the rst and second data set are qualitatively very
similar. In the data by G achter and Herrmann (2009) average antisocial
punishment meted out by top earners is 2.24 compared to .95 by all other
subjects. The dierence is signicant (z =  3:04, p = 0:002, test based on
individual observations). The lower part of Table 4 shows that also in this
data set the majority of antisocial punishment acts (72%) is not accompanied
by free rider punishment.
3.1 Subject pool heterogeneity
Herrmann et al. (2008) report data from 16 subject pools from various
cultural backgrounds. They observe punishment decisions from experi-







. Their data contains observations from 1,120 sub-
jects in 16 cities around the globe. The 16 subject pools dier markedly in
the frequency and strength of antisocial punishment. Thus, even if inequal-
ity fails to explain antisocial punishment in the two data sets analyzed so far
it is possible that this explanation works well in some of the subject pools
observed by Herrmann et al. (2008).12
Table 5 shows the two measures discussed above for each of the 16 sub-
ject pools separately. The rst column shows the average punishment meted
12The analysis presented here uses data from a dynamic game to test a static prediction.
This could be problematic because of strategic incentives in early rounds of the game. To
check whether the results are robust with regard to this concern I ran the analysis for
the last period only. The last punishment subgame played presents a true one-shot game.
The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
11Antisocial punishment when... Perc. only anti-
richest not richest social punishment
Athens 4.03 0.86 86.4%
Bonn 0.34 0.48 68.3%
Boston 0.26 0.15 93.3%
Chengdu 0.50 0.34 89.4%
Copenhagen 0.33 0.28 84.2%
Dnipropetrovs'k 1.37 0.65 80.9%
Istanbul 1.32 0.72 72.4%
Melbourne 0.73 0.32 80.0%
Minsk 1.44 1.39 64.5%
Muscat 3.81 3.23 67.6%
Nottingham 0.37 0.13 83.3%
Riyadh 1.86 2.23 57.7%
Samara 2.34 1.02 73.7%
Seoul 0.60 0.40 79.0%
St.Gallen 0.49 0.34 81.3%
Zurich 0.48 0.20 85.1%
Total 1.03 0.79 75.5%
Table 5: Patterns of antisocial punishment across subject pools. Data
source: Herrmann et al. (2008), own calculation.
out by subjects who are maximum earners in the specic period. This is the
number that should be zero according to the prediction. Obviously there is
a huge variation in the strength of antisocial punishment. Average punish-
ment diers by more than a factor ten when comparing the extreme cases.
The second column shows the average antisocial punishment of subjects
who are not among the richest in their group. In 14 out of the 16 subject
pools subjects choose more antisocial punishment when they are top earners
compared to when there are others in the group with higher stage 1 incomes.
The third column in Table 5 shows the fraction of antisocial punishment
acts not accompanied by free rider punishment. Everywhere, in at least
50 percent of the cases with antisocial punishment subjects mete out only
antisocial punishment. To conclude, despite the huge dierences in the
level of antisocial punishment across subject pools the pattern of antisocial
punishment acts does not dier substantially. In none of the subject pools
antisocial punishment seems to be motivated by inequality aversion.
4 Conclusion
To test whether observed acts of antisocial punishment can be explained
by inequality aversion as formalized by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) I derived
two conditions: (i) the punishing subject must not be among the richest
in the group, and (ii) antisocial punishment requires accompanying acts of
12free rider punishment. Empirical evidence on antisocial punishment shows
that a majority of the punishment acts occur in situations in which these
two criteria are not met. Thus, inequality aversion is not a key determi-
nant of antisocial punishment. This paper contributes to the literature on
motives behind the punishment acts. Fowler et al. (2005) and Dawes et
al. (2007) argue that egalitarian motives drive punishment decisions. This
might be the case for free rider punishment but most likely not for anti-
social punishment. The results presented here are in line with Falk et al.
(2005), who compare the frequently used punishment technology (c = 1
3)
to a one-to-one punishment technology (c = 1). In the latter regime no
Fehr-Schmidt player would use punishment. However, in their experiments
with Prisoners' Dilemma games cooperators punished defectors also in the
treatments with c = 1, despite the fact that payo dierences could not
be reduced.13 Defectors' punishment of cooperators was observed if c = 1
3
but vanished in the treatments with the one-to-one punishment, indicating
that relative payo concerns may be an important determinant of antiso-
cial punishment.14 However, the relative payo maximization hypothesis
has one serious aw when applied to public goods experiments with four
players and one-to-three punishment mechanism (like used e.g. in Fehr and
G achter, 2002 or Herrmann et al., 2008): Given these parameters no player
can improve her relative position towards the others by punishment. Due
to c = 1
3 every unit invested in the punishment of another player j increases
the relative position towards j by two units (j loses three, punisher loses
one). However, at the same time the relative position towards the other two
players decreases by one unit. Thus, if a relative payo maximizer weighs all
bilateral comparison equally, then punishment does not improve the relative
position at all.15
Understanding the determinants of antisocial punishment is crucial, given
that the eciency of sanctioning mechanisms strongly depends on the fre-
quency and strength of antisocial punishment, leading to strikingly dierent
macro results across dierent cultures (G achter, Herrmann, & Th oni, 2010).
The contribution of this paper is to show that interdependent preferences
as formalized in the Fehr-Schmidt model provides a rationale for antisocial
punishment. Interestingly, antisocial punishment as rationalized by Fehr-
Schmidt preferences is kind of a higher order punishment, targeted to play-
ers who are unwilling to bear their share of the punishment costs necessary
13See also Masclet and Villeval (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) for data on one-to-one
punishment.
14See also Houser and Xiao (2010).
15Such a relative payo maximizer could be characterized by having a utility function as
shown in equation (3) with  < 0. For example, a player with  =   would always want
to punish other players (irrespective of whether they are poorer or richer) if cn < 1 + c
and  >
c(n 1)
1+c cn. For the parameters used in Fehr and G achter (2002) and Herrmann
et al. (2008) the rst condition holds with equality and requirements for  go to innity.
13to discipline the free riders (see e.g. Denant-Boemont, Masclet, and Nous-
sair, 2007). Seen from this angle, antisocial punishment might not be that
`perverse' after all.
The data, however, suggest that other forces must be at work. A likely
candidate is revenge. Subjects might engage in antisocial punishment to
take revenge for punishment received in past periods or for anticipated pun-
ishment in the current period. Herrmann et al. (2008) provide evidence
for this, showing that antisocial punishment is stronger when a subject was
punished in the previous period. A second likely candidate is that some sub-
jects might simply enjoy to destroy others' property. There is experimental
evidence that, in some settings, subjects reduce other subjects' incomes,
even if this comes at a cost to themselves (see e.g. Zizzo and Oswald, 2001,
Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). For public goods games with punishment un-
der uncertainty Grechenig, Nicklisch, and Th oni (2010) show that, contrary
to the expectation, being in doubt about other subjects' actions does not
discourage from using the punishment option. Thus, a pure `appetite for
destruction' might account for some of the antisocial punishment acts. This
would be compatible with the observation that antisocial punishment is, to
a large extent, meted out by subjects with a high payo. These are the
subjects who can aord to spend money on their pleasure to reduce the
income of others without falling behind others. An experimental analysis
that cleanly separates these causes is yet to be conducted.
Appendix
Prerequisites
There are two types of players: A homogenous subgroup of n0 < n enforcers
E1, E2, ..., En0 with ; > 0, and n   n0 other players with ; = 0. All
enforcers have identical provisional income, i.e., wE1 = wE2 = ::: = wEn0.
In case of n0 > 1 there is usually an innite number of equilibria in which
all enforcers spend an equal amount on punishment. In the following I
will derive the symmetric equilibria most ecient for the enforcers. The
homogeneity assumption facilitates the derivation of equilibria because all
enforcers either punish or don't punish. In equilibrium all enforcers punish
equally and no inequality among them arises.
What are the conditions under which Fehr-Schmidt players might engage
in antisocial punishment? Enforcers face a distribution of provisional payos
w and seek to maximize their utility by choosing a punishment vector pEk
for all k = 1;:::;n0. In the group there are n n0 other players. These players
shall be ordered according their initial income wi, such that the incomes of
the players are w1 > w2 > ::: > wr > wEk > wr+1 > ::: > wn n0, i.e.,
Player 1 is the richest player, r players are weakly richer than the enforcers,
14and n n0  r players are strictly poorer. The variable r is an indicator for
the enforcers' position in the income hierarchy. For r = 0 the enforcers are
the strictly richest players and there are n   n0 poorer players. In case of
r = n   n0 the enforcers are (among) the poorest players.
Proof of C1
Will the enforcers ever punish players with a lower income? Due to c < 1 this
increases inequality towards the punished player. Furthermore, it reduces
the enforcers' incomes by c and increases the inequality towards all players
who are or become richer than the enforcers. The only benet the enforcers
can get from punishing a poorer player is that the reduction of their income
reduces inequality towards the other players with lower incomes by c. The
case most favorable for punishing a poorer player is thus the situation where
a single enforcer is the richest player, i.e., r = 0. In such a situation it would
be utility enhancing to punish another player if benets outweigh costs, i.e.,

n   1
(n   2)c > c +

n   1
(1   c): (4)
Rearranging leads to  

c(n 1) > 1. This inequality can only be satised
for  > 1, which is ruled out by the parameter restrictions of the Fehr-
Schmidt model. Thus, irrespective of the position in the income distribution
the enforcers will never punish a player with lower income than themselves.
Note that this does not exclude that punishment of players with wi < wE
eventually takes place, when the enforcers become poorer than other players
due to their punishment of free riders. However, if the enforcers are among
the richest players in the rst place, then this situation cannot occur and,
consequently, antisocial punishment can be ruled out. 
Proof of C2
What is the structure of the optimal punishment strategy? The examples in
the main text already demonstrated that it can be utility enhancing for the
enforcers to punish free riders. The crucial question is not whether, but how
many richer players the enforcers are ready to punish.16 Punishing r weakly
richer player has costs and benets: (i) punishment has direct costs of rc,
(ii) due to c < 1 this decreases the disadvantageous inequality towards the
punished player, and (iii) it reduces the enforcers' payo advantage towards
the other n r n0 players with lower income by c. Taken together, punishing
16Due to the linearity in payo dierences in the Fehr-Schmidt utility function E is
indierent between shifting punishment points from one richer player to another richer
player. Thus, if a player E is ready to punish one richer player by, say , then she is also
ready to punish two richer players by

2.

















This expression allows to identify the eect of changes in the preference
parameters: punishing richer players is more likely to be protable if the
enforcers' inequality aversion becomes stronger ( and ). Equalizing ben-
ets and cost in equation (5) and solving for r gives the maximum integer










It is easy to show that ~ r increases in the number of enforcers n0. The
expression is decreasing in n, which is due to the fact that in larger groups
the inequality towards the r richer players has less weight in an enforcer's
utility function. Furthermore, ~ r is decreasing in c, i.e., more expensive
punishment reduces the number of other players the enforcers are willing to
punish.
What is the optimal amount of punishment? As demonstrated in Table 2
we have to check whether punishment is constrained by the income of the
next poorer player or not. For unconstrained punishment all enforcers and
weakly richer players have the same nal payo, i.e., we have to solve the




pEkj = wi  
n0 X
k=1
pEki 8 i = 1;:::;r and k = 1;:::;n0; (7)
where the nal income of an enforcer k is on the left hand side and the
right hand side shows the income of a weakly richer player i. To simplify
matters we assume that punishment of a player i is split equally among the
enforcers. This allows to replace pEkj by pEj and the sum on the right hand






j=1 wj   n0wE
n0(n0   rc)
: (8)









i=1 wi   rcwE
n0   rc
: (9)
17Here I assume that all enforcers use the same punishment strategy so that no inequality
towards other enforcers arises. In case of n
0 > 1 equation 5 describes a joint optimization
for all enforcers.
16Clearly the amount of punishment necessary to bring down the r weakly
richer players decreases in n0. When is punishment unconstrained? If wE  
r
E > wr+1 then there is enough `room' to punish all richer players without
undershooting the income of the next poorer player.
Otherwise the enforcers are in the constrained case. Here the enforcers'
incomes will touch wr+1 before they could equate all incomes of the r richer
players with their own incomes. If this happens the number of weakly richer
players increases by one and the optimal punishment for r + 1 comes into
action. The enforcers will include further players into the group of punishees
until either (i) there is no strictly richer player anymore or (ii) the group
of weakly richer players exceeds ~ r. To conclude, punishment expenditures
depend on the distribution of the preliminary incomes w which is charac-




> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if r = 0 or r > ~ r
r
E else if r
E 6 wE   wr+1
r+1
E else if r+1
E 6 wE   wr+2
. . .
~ r
E else if ~ r
E 6 wE   w~ r+1 or r = ~ r
wE   w~ r+1 else
(10)
In all but the rst and last case the enforcers reduce the incomes of richer
players such that all r players earn the same income as the enforcers. In
doing so the group of weakly richer players might increase up to a maximum
of ~ r. Depending on the provisional income of player ~ r + 1 the enforcers
equalize the incomes of all ~ r players or mete out punishment such that their
income is equal to w~ r+1. In the latter case the free riders will keep some of
their monetary payo advantage relative to the enforcers (as demonstrated
by the case of the weakly inequality averse player in Table 2).
To conclude, if none of the players are richer than the enforcers then
no one will be punished. If some of the players are richer and others are
poorer than the enforcers, then the poorer players are punished if and only
if the enforcers become poorer than some of these players due to the pun-
ishment of free riders. Consequently, antisocial punishment can only occur
in combination with free rider punishment. 
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